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LIAT LEVANON*
THE LAW OF POLICE ENTRAPMENT: CRITICAL
EVALUATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS
ABSTRACT. This article provides a critical analysis of the law of police entrapment
and proposes a new foundation for this law. The article shows that the shift of scene’
assumption underlies existing and proposed legal tests for the legitimacy of entrap-
ment. According to this assumption, in some identifiable cases the defendant would
have committed a similar offence at a different time and location absent police
entrapment. In these cases, entrapment is morally and economically insignificant and
hence legitimate. Using probabilistic analysis, the article advances the argument that
the shift of scene’ assumption is misguided. Entrapment actually changes (usually
raises) the probability of commission, and hence also the defendant’s punishment
expectancy, in almost all cases. This increase is hard to justify on grounds of justice or
on economic grounds. The article then proposes a different basis for the analysis of
entrapment, building on the idea of reallocation of burdens: where the defendant
creates particularly heavy burdens that go beyond the offence’s harm expectancy, it is
justified to increase his punishment expectancy through entrapment. Furthermore,
entrapment should be conceptualized as amitigating factor, thus allowing the courts to
correct’ exaggerated or undue increases in the defendant’s punishment expectancy.
I INTRODUCTION
Drug dealing around schools is a pressing issue. The police send a
young and boyish-looking police officer to hang around a school and
ask passers-by if they could get him some Heroin for a good price.
Now consider two scenarios: in the first, the school is in a neigh-
bourhood with high crime rates, and John, a drug dealer, is en-
trapped. In the second, the school is in a middle-class neighbourhood
free of crime, and Donna is entrapped. Donna has never sold drugs
before but is now in great financial difficulties; as the undercover
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approaches her, she remembers a childhood friend whom she has not
seen for years but knows might be able to provide her with Heroin.
Gut feeling’ tells us that Donna’s entrapment is illegitimate.1 What
about John? Probably, many would feel that his entrapment does not
give rise to special difficulties. In law, the European, the English, the
Canadian, and the American tests for entrapment would lead to the
same conclusions. The European Court of Human Rights has
acknowledged the legitimacy of police action in cases like John’s,
where there was no such an influence on the defendant as to incite the
commission of an offence that would otherwise not have been com-
mitted.2 On the other hand, in Donna’s case the offence would not
have been committed if it were not for police intervention, and hence
the entrapment is illegitimate. According to the English test, John’s
entrapment is legitimate since the police did nothing more than pro-
viding him with an unexceptional opportunity to sell Heroin.3 Donna,
on the other hand, was provided with an exceptional opportunity to
commit crime, and thus her entrapment is illegitimate. Similarly,
according to the Canadian test, John’s entrapment is legitimate since
the police undertook a bona fide investigation directed at an area
where it is reasonably suspected that criminal activity is occurring, and
they did not go beyond providing John with an opportunity to sell
Heroin.4 Donna’s entrapment is illegitimate since police action was
not part of such a bona fide investigation, and in addition, their offer
of a reward which was unusual in the circumstances seems to have
induced Donna to sell Heroin. And according to the prevailing sub-
jective version of the American test, police inducement was offered to
John who was already predisposed to commit the offence, and hence
his entrapment is legitimate. Donna, on the other hand, was provided
1 I am drawing here on Gerald Dworkin’s approach to the analysis of entrapment
in Gerald Dworkin, Ethics and Entrapment’, Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987)
p. 57. See also Gerald Dworkin, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: Entrap-
ment and the Creation of Crime’, (1985) 4 Law and Philosophy 17.
2 Ramanauskas v. Lithuania App no 74420/01, IHRL 3267 (ECHR 2008), 5th
February 2008, [GC], § 55. The determination is done with reference to various
factors such as the existence of objective suspicion that the defendant had been
involved in criminal activity or was predisposed to commit a similar offence. Ban-
nikova v. Russia, unreported, App no 18757/06, 4 November 2010 (ECtHR) § 38.
3 R v Looseley; Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 2000), [2001] 1 WLR
2060. For criticism see Dan Squires, The Problem with Entrapment’, (2006) 26
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 351.
4 R.v.Mack 1988 CanLll 24 (S.C.C.) (1988) 44 C.C.C. (3d) 513 (S.C.C.) at p.559; R
v Barnes, [1991] 1 SCR 449.
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with inducement despite not being predisposed to commit crime, and
hence her entrapment is illegitimate.5 In a concurring judgement,
Judge Richard Posner has suggested that American law should focus
less on the defendant’s psychology and more on police action,
examining whether, considering the nature of this action, the defen-
dant was likely to have committed similar crime at a different time and
location absent the action (hereinafter: the shift of scene’ assump-
tion).6 This modified test would probably lead to similar conclusions:
the police offered a good price for drugs, but it was still likely that
John would commit similar crime even absent this offer; Donna, on
the other hand, was unlikely to have resolved her financial difficulties
in this way absent the offer.
The literature on entrapment revolves mainly around the existing
legal tests.7 Some of it refines the tests or discusses their appropriate
scope;8 and much of it debates the subjectivism’ of the prevailing
American test and the objectivism’ of many of the other tests,
addressing the different values they promote and their different
practical implications.9 Several authors have also recognized links
5 See Sorrells v US 287 US 435. 452 (1932) and its subsequent interpretation in US
v Russell 411 US 423, 429 (1973). For criticism see e.g. Kevin A. Smith, Psychology,
Factfinding, and Entrapment’, (2004) 103 Michigan Law Review 759; B. Grant Stitt
and Gene G. James, Entrapment and the Entrapment Defence: Dilemmas for a
Democratic Society’, (1984) 3 Law and Philosophy 111 at 115–117. See also T. Ward
Frampton, Predisposition and Positivism: The Forgotten Foundations of the
Entrapment Doctrine’ (2013) 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 111. But compare with
MPC § 2.13.
6 United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983). Posner’s ap-
proach is discussed in Part I, Section A.
7 See e.g. David M. Tanovich, Rethinking the Bona Fides of Entrapment’ (2011)
43 U.B.C. L. Rev. 417; Andrew Choo, A Defence of Entrapment’, (1990) 53 The
Modern Law Review 453; Andrew Ashworth, What is Wrong with Entrapment’,
(1999) Sing. J. Legal Stud. 293; Andrew Ashworth, Re-Drawing the Boundaries of
Entrapment’ [2002] Crim LR 161; Andrew Ashworth, Testing Fidelity to Legal
Values: Official Involvement and Criminal Justice’, in S Shute and A Simester (eds),
Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002) 315; Mike Redmayne, Exploring Entrapment’ in L Zedner and J V
Roberts (eds), Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Essays in
Honour of Andrew Ashworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 157; HL Ho,
State Entrapment’ (2010) 31 Legal Studies 71; Smith, no. 5 above. For economic
analysis of entrapment see J. Gregory Deis, Economics, Causation, and the
Entrapment Defence’ (2001) University of Illinois Law Review 1207.
8 Redmayne, ibid., provides such a sophisticated analysis.
9 Ashworth, What is Wrong with Entrapment’, no. 7 above, and Choo, no. 7
above, are two examples of such discussions.
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between the tests.10 Nevertheless, the connection between the tests
has not yet been explored in depth. There is no available analysis
which identifies and criticizes the basic idea underlying both of them.
This article aims to fill up that gap.
Setting margins aside, the tests have in common one basic idea11:
that the legitimacy of entrapment depends on the deviation it creates
from the otherwise-expected course of events. Where the actual
course of events (the entrapment course’) is normatively similar to
the otherwise-expected course of events, entrapment is legitimate.
Where the actual course of events deviates from the otherwise-ex-
pected course of events, entrapment is illegitimate. The tests present
different ways of comparing the actual course of events and a
hypothetical course of events lacking police interference – either by
focusing on the exceptionality of the opportunity the police presented
compared to otherwise available opportunities, or by focusing on D’s
otherwise-expected course of conduct. Despite the different focus,
both tests examine whether, looking at the entire picture (including
police action and D’s part), D would have committed a similar of-
fence in the hypothetical course of events lacking police intervention.
By comparing the actual course of events with the hypothetical
course of events the tests aim to identify the cases in which entrap-
ment gives rise to no special difficulties and can be easily justified. If
entrapment does not create normatively significant deviations from
the expected course of events, it has no bearings for D’s punishment
expectancy prior to commission (it remains the same as it would have
been absent the entrapment). Entrapment can then be justified on
grounds of justice, as it gives D that which she deserves and nothing
more – it does not make her worse off than she would have been
absent police intervention. And it can also be justified on economic
grounds, as it merely replaces the offence’s harm expectancy with its
correlating punishment expectancy the way criminal law is supposed
to do to optimally deter from crime commission.12 Thus, where the
tests apply, entrapment is legitimate.
10 See Judge Posner’s version of the American test; Ashworth, no. 7 above;
Dworkin, no. 1 above; Squires, no. 3 above; L.M. Seidman The Supreme Court,
Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma’, (1982) Sup. Ct. Rev. 1981 111.
11 And indeed Ashworth notes that each of them could be modified in light of the
other’s policies and guiding principles. Ashworth, no. 7 above, 297.
12 In an economic model of criminal law, the punishment expectancy for any
offence is already calculated to be optimal (thus as long as it is not altered, optimal
deterrence is achieved). For an economic model of criminal law see Gary S. Becker,
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The assumptions underlying this comparative approach are (1)
that there are indeed cases where police intervention does not change
D’s punishment expectancy and hence does not create normatively
significant deviations from the expected course of events, and (2) that
the tests appropriately identify these cases. In other words, all the
tests make good sense only under the shift of scene’ assumption
mentioned by Judge Posner. Where entrapment merely shifts the
scene of crime, it does not change D’s punishment expectancy, and
hence it is justifiable.13
But the shift of scene’ assumption is far from obvious.14 Proba-
bilistic examination demonstrates that the shift of scene’ assumption
has no mathematical validity: police intervention hardly ever merely
changes the timing and location of crime. Rather, police intervention
increases the likelihood of crime commission in most cases. Fur-
thermore, to the extent that there may be rare cases in which police
intervention merely shifts the scene of crime, the existing tests cannot
identify them. Accordingly, there is hardly any solid basis for the
existing legal tests of entrapment.
Part I of the article advances this argument. After introducing two
of the most powerful rationales proposed thus far for the law of
entrapment, it uses simple probabilistic analysis and Bayesian
methods to show that whether they encourage crime or merely pro-
vide an unexceptional opportunity to commit crime, whether D is
already predisposed towards crime or engaged in crime or not, police
action never merely shifts the scene of crime; it always changes the
probability of crime commission. This change requires justification
Footnote 12 continued
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’, in Gary S. Becker and William
M. Landes eds. Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment (National Bureau
of Economic Research: 1974) 1. The suggestion that for some offences the punish-
ment expectancy is sub-optimal, and in such cases entrapment is legitimate, is dis-
cussed further in Part II, Section E.
13 Part I, sections B and C(I) discuss two exceptional attempts to justify a pre-
sumed increase in punishment expectancy or part of it. See Thomas J. Miceli,
Criminal Solicitation, Entrapment, and the Enforcement of Law’, (2007) 27 Inter-
national Review of Law and Economics 258; and another by Gerald Dworkin, The
Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: Entrapment and the Creation of Crime’, no. 1
above.
14 Compare with Redmayne, no. 7 above, 167. Accordingly, Redmayne preferred
a relatively narrow test allowing entrapment only of defendants who were already
engaged in offending. Arguably, this test too relies on a shift of scene’ assumption,
even if it restricts the range of cases in which it claims to identify it.
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which the existing tests for entrapment and the rationales proposed
for these tests fail to account for. Accordingly, the existing tests for
entrapment lack a solid theoretical foundation.
If this is the case, a different rationale for a law of entrapment
should be proposed, which might lead to different legal distinctions
and to a different approach to entrapment. Part II of the article
argues that what existing law and much literature fail to consider is
the defensive nature of entrapment and accordingly its proximity to
the doctrine of self-defence. It is submitted that the aim of both self-
defence and entrapment is to reallocate the risks and burdens D
imposes on others. Accordingly, in appropriate cases, where these
risks and burdens are sufficiently high, D exposes himself to a radical
defensive response – be it by way of e.g. lethal self-defensive force or
by way of entrapment. In other cases self-defensive force and
entrapment are out of the question.
II PART I: PROBABILISTIC IMPLICATIONS OF POLICE
ENTRAPMENT
The basic assumption underlying the law of entrapment and its
proposed rationales is that in some cases, entrapment merely shifts
the scene of crime. Yet existing accounts of entrapment give rise to
various difficulties, many of which are have to do with the falsehood
of this underlying assumption: probabilistic analysis demonstrates
that crime is never merely relocated.
2.1 Standard Economic Accounts
Standard economic analysis suggests that entrapment is cost-effective
and legitimate where crime is relocated rather than created. In Judge
Richard Posner’s words in the American case of Kaminski, if the
police are just inducing someone to commit sooner a crime he would
have committed eventually, but do so in controlled circumstances
where the costs to the criminal justice system of apprehension and
conviction are minimized, the police are economizing on resources…
If this is right, the implementing concept of predisposition to crime’
calls less for psychological conjecture than for a common-sense
assessment of whether it is likely that the defendant would have
committed the crime anyway – without the blandishments the police
used on him – but at a time and place where it would have been more
difficult for them to apprehend him and the state to convict him, or
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whether the police used threats or promises so powerful that a law-
abiding individual was induced to commit a crime. If the latter is the
case, the police tactics do not merely affect the timing and location of
a crime; they cause crime’.15 Thus, the central question concerns the
likelihood that D would have committed the offence absent police
intervention,16 and this question should be answered either in the
positive or in the negative using common-sense assessment’ and
considering the nature of the inducement the police presented.
Posner’s analysis compares the actual course of events with the
otherwise-expected course of events. It builds on the likely-unlikely’
binary, in which likely’ is treated for purposes of the legal analysis as
would have committed’, and unlikely’ is treated as would not have
committed’.17 The rest of the analysis flows from this presumed bin-
ary: for those defendants who fall within the would have committed’
category, police action does nothing much: these defendants would
have committed’ with or without police action; and thus police action
merely affects the timing and location of crime, or shifts the scene of
crime. On the other hand, for those defendants who fall within the
would not have committed’ category, police action changes category:
they would not have committed’ absent police action, but would have
committed’ with police action; and thus police action causes crime.
But in the sphere of likelihood and probability there is no likely’
and unlikely’ binary, and accordingly the police hardly ever merely
shift the scene of crime or indeed cause crime in Posner’s sense.
Likelihood is continuous and accordingly likely’ and unlikely’ do
not mean would have committed’ and would not have committed’.
There is, indeed, a binary of more likely than not to have committed’
and less likely to have committed than not to have committed’. But
this binary has no bearings for Posner’s derivative distinction be-
15 United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
16 Interestingly, Ho proposes a very similar test based on different considerations.
For Ho, the relevant question is whether the crime with which the accused is charged
is of a type that, without the state interference, he or she would probably never have
committed’ (no. 7 above, 95). Much of the criticism over Posner’s test is relevant for
Ho’s test too.
17 See also Deis, no. 7 above, 1230. Deis speaks of the probability that D is a true
offender, assuming that he is either a true offender’ or not, and that only our
knowledge of the answer can be described in probabilistic terms. Speaking again in
non-probabilistic terms, he further suggests on p. 1232 that society has no interest in
entrapping people who are willing to commit crime for a price higher than current
market price because they do not pose a threat.
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tween merely shifting the scene of crime and causing crime. The fact
that D1 was less likely to have committed similar crime than not to
have committed similar crime absent police intervention does not
mean that the police created his crime - police intervention might not
have changed the probability of commission, or it might even have
decreased the probability of commission. And the fact that D2 was
more likely than not to have committed similar crime absent police
intervention does not mean that police intervention merely shifted the
scene of the crime – police intervention might well have further in-
creased this probability. Thus, the causing’ – shifting the scene’
distinction has no sound probabilistic basis to rely on.
To make this more apparent, let us assume that likely’ reflects any
probability that is above 50%, and unlikely’ reflects any probability
that is below 50%. Let us further ignore for the moment, as does
Posner, the (relevant) question of the cost of enforcement.18 It is hard
to see why entrapping D1 whose likelihood of commission is 40%
causes crime and is a mere waste of resources, while entrapping D2
whose likelihood of commission is 60% merely shifts the scene of
crime and makes good use of resources. In probabilistic terms, there
was a significant likelihood of 40% that D1 would actually have
committed crime (say, rape); and as we shall see below, police action
could have changed this likelihood either way. Yet even if police
action raised the probability of commission, it is hard to say that it
caused the commission and wasted resources when stopping D1 from
committing the rape in an uncontrolled environment. There was also
a significant likelihood of 40% that D2 would not have committed his
crime, and as we shall see below, police action probably reduced this
likelihood – which makes it hard to say that they merely shifted the
scene of crime. In other words, the 50% point has no special prob-
abilistic significance which might provide foundation for the causing
crime’ – shifting scene’ distinction.
These conclusions will not change if it is assumed that the likely-
unlikely’ binary represents more extreme probabilities such as 80%
and 20%. First, such an assumption would not allow determining the
legitimacy of many cases of entrapment where the probability of
commission absent the entrapment is milder (between 20% and
80%).19 Second, even under this assumption crime is never merely
18 See Becker, no. 12 above.
19 Unless it is assumed that the hypothetical commission should be proven beyond
reasonable doubt; but this too raises difficulties – see discussion in this part, Sec-
tion E.
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relocated – the probability of commission (and thus D’s punishment
expectancy) can still be raised following police intervention even for
D whose prior likelihood of commission is 80%; and this possible
increase in D’s punishment expectancy beyond the normal and pre-
sumably optimal punishment expectancy is still hard to justify. It is
surely not justifiable on the sole basis that the original punishment
expectancy is relatively high.20 The fact that the punishment ex-
pectancy is high cannot suggest that it is suboptimal.
Posner’s analysis thus conceals the probabilistic nature of its
underlying distinctions, or at least does not endow it with its due
analytic significance. What Posner’s analysis does not show is that for
each defendant there is a different likelihood of commission prior to
police action, and further that police action always changes this
likelihood – even for defendants whose likelihood of commission is in
the extremes. Thus, police action never (or at least hardly ever) affects
merely the timing and location of crime. It is always (or almost al-
ways) a contributing factor affecting the decision to commit crime.
Furthermore, Posner’s analysis does not take into account some of
the differences between professional criminals and law-abiding citi-
zens. When Posner suggests focusing only on police action (whether
they used powerful threats or promises) and not on defendants’
characteristics (which can be somewhat inaccurately described as
their predisposition’21), he fails to account for the fact that profes-
sional criminals might actually refrain from crime in the face of a
particularly strong inducement that would have worked on a more
naı̈ve law-abiding citizens.22 Considering these difficulties, it seems
impossible to base the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
entrapment on Posner’s rationale.
20 It is arguable that while the probability of commission and the harm expectancy
are high, the punishment expectancy might still be relatively low, at least in certain
offences in the context of which entrapment is often deployed. This argument is
discussed in Part I, Section E.
21 Dworkin notes that The issue of predisposition, which runs through the
entrapment commentary, is a red herring.’ Dworkin, no. 1 above, at 29. For
Dworkin, We are not interested in the general willingness of an offender to commit
crime but in whether he has formed the intent to engage in a specific crime if the
opportunity presents itself.’ (ibid.).
22 Miceli captures this by demonstrating the deterring effect of police sting oper-
ations on professional criminals (no. 13 above).
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2.2 Fairness and Coherence
Gerald Dworkin presents a different analysis of entrapment law – an
analysis whose principles have found expression also in Andrew
Ashworth’s account of entrapment.23 Dworkin draws a distinction
between inviting or encouraging crime, and providing an opportunity
to commit crime (where providing opportunity’ is defined narrowly
to capture only very laid back practices of the police).24 The second is
always legitimate; and the first is only legitimate if the police have a
probable cause to suppose that D is already engaged in this kind of
crime.25 Dworkin grounds these distinctions in considerations of
fairness and conceptual coherence of the criminal justice system: the
system cannot forbid and then encourage committing that which it
forbids, unless the intent to commit such crimes if the opportunity
presents itself has already been formulated.26 Thus, much police pro-
active action is presumed to have normative significance.
Dworkin’s analysis seems at first sight to acknowledge the prob-
abilistic nature of the question of entrapment. In his argumentation,
Dworkin states briefly that both providing an opportunity to commit
crime and encouraging crime increase the probability of commission,
and hence some may regard [the distinction] as hairsplitting’.27 But
for him, increasing probability of commission does not always re-
quire justification; presumably, in the case of opportunity-provision,
it does not. To advance this argument, Dworkin notes that shifting
police forces from one area to the other would lead to increased
probability of crime in the first, yet it does not require justification.28
Increasing the probability of commission requires justification where
the point of police action is to increase this probability.29 Yet this
does not seem to resolve the problem, since both when the police
merely create opportunities and when they encourage crime, the point
of their action is to have someone fall in this or the other trap, or to
increase the probability of crime commission. If this is the case, then
23 Ashworth, Re-Drawing the Boundaries of Entrapment’, no. 7 above, 163.
24 Dworkin, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat’, no. 1 above, 27.
25 Dworkin, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat’, no. 1 above, 33.
26 Dworkin, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat’, no. 1 above, 32–34.
27 Dworkin, Ethics and Entrapment’, no. 1 above, 58.
28 Dworkin, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat’, no. 1 above, 26; Dworkin,
Ethics and Entrapment’, no. 1 above, 58.
29 Dworkin, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat’, no. 1 above, 26.
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the question remains: what does the distinction between providing an
opportunity and encouraging or inviting crime rest on?
Furthermore, Dworkin’s analysis then goes back to the assump-
tion that in some cases the police do not raise the probability of
commission, and that in these cases entrapment is legitimate. He
explains the difference between D who is already engaged in crime
(and hence it is legitimate for the police to invite or encourage her to
commit crime) and other Ds who are not engaged in crime (and hence
it is illegitimate to invite or encourage them to commit crime).
Referring to offers to commit crime addressed to those already en-
gaged in similar crimes, he says: Leaving aside complications… such
offers are on the portion of the spectrum closer to shifting the scene of
criminal activity;’30 and accordingly they are legitimate. Referring to
offers addressed to Ds who are not already engaged in crime, he
states: In such cases there is the danger that one may not merely shift
the scene of criminal activity but create crime that otherwise would
not have occurred;’31 and accordingly such encouragement is illegit-
imate. Both these contentions regress towards a distinction which is
founded on the familiar shifting the scene’ criterion, whose under-
lying assumption is that in some cases police activity does not change
the probability of crime commission. And if this is the case, Dwor-
kin’s distinctions and their proposed rationale are similar in this re-
spect to Posner’s ones.
2.3 Probabilistic Analysis: Police Action Doesn’t Merely Shift the
Scene of Crime
Any temptation or opportunity to commit crime presented by the
police changes the likelihood of D committing crime. This is true
whether D has had a pre-existing predisposition towards committing
crime or has been a law-abiding citizen; and it is true whether the
temptation or opportunity presented by the police is exceptional or
just the kind of opportunity D has every day. Accordingly, proactive
policing can never be said to merely shift the scene of crime, and it
cannot be justified with reference to the cost-effectiveness, to the
fairness, or to the coherence of shifting the scene of crime.
To advance this argument, the following analysis uses different
methods to examine two reference classes: the class of law-abiding
citizens and the class of predisposed defendants’. It is presumed that
30 Dworkin, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat’, no. 1 above, 27.
31 ibid.
THE LAW OF POLICE ENTRAPMENT 45
predisposed defendants’ are either professional criminals or defen-
dants who were looking for an opportunity to commit crime.32 Either
way, they would be exposed to relatively many opportunities to
commit crime (since they seek for such opportunities, and some will
be living in areas which are not crime-free). The law-abiding’ citizens
might or might not be exposed to many opportunities to commit
crime – depending on the type of crime (shop-lifting or drug dealing)
and on the area where they live (often it would be crime-free, but
sometimes it would not). For each of these reference classes, the
impact of strong and exceptional inducements and the impact of
weak and unexceptional inducements are observed. It should be
noted, though, that the division to two reference classes is artificial:
actually, there is a spectrum of reference classes between the two
extremes identified above (some people are more prone to law-
braking than others). Yet focusing on the two extremes shows that
proactive policing changes the likelihood of commission across the
entire spectrum of reference classes.
Simple probabilistic analysis is first used to examine the impact of
entrapment on the expectancy of crime per time unit (say, a day or a
year). Next, Bayes’s Theorem is used to examine the impact of
entrapment on the probability of crime commission per opportunity
to commit crime; and a brief Bayesian analysis of the impact per time
unit is then provided - mainly to identify the narrow group of cases in
which the impact per time unit diverges from the impact per
opportunity, and to explain the significance of this divergence.
Conceptually, the expectancy of crime per time unit is of particular
interest for economic analysis of the law, and the probability of crime
commission per opportunity is of particular interest for justice-based
analysis. Economic analysis aims to adopt strategies which reduce
social costs over time, while justice-based analysis seeks to maintain
justice or fairness for D over each encounter with the police. Yet the
two likelihoods are strongly connected: in the vast majority of cases,
where one is increased following entrapment, the other is also in-
creased, and vice versa. There are two reasons for examining both
likelihoods: first, as already implied, they are not always directly
correlated, and in some cases the expectancy of crime per time unit
32 The literature has attributed significance to the difference between the two and
also to some other variants between the professional criminal and the law abiding
citizen. See Redmayne’s discussion, no. 8 above, especially 166–168. The difference is
of lesser significance for the purposes of the current investigation, which focuses on
the likelihood of similar commission.
LIAT LEVANON46
may increase even though the probability of commission per
opportunity decreases.33 In these cases, economic analysis may di-
verge from justice-based analysis. Second, each of the examinations
puts the spotlight on different factors affecting the probability of
commission following entrapment; together, they provide a full pic-
ture of the various relevant factors.
2.3.1 Simple Probabilistic Analysis
One way of showing the probabilistic implications of entrapment is
by using simple probabilistic calculation to examine the changes in
the likelihood of crime commission per time unit following entrap-
ment (or the changes in crime expectancy following entrapment) –
changes which are particularly relevant for an economic analysis of
the law.
When it comes to the class of law-abiding citizens, the analysis
seems straightforward: we can mark the expectancy of crime com-
mission by a law-abiding citizen over a year as E; and then E = N*P,
where N is the number of opportunities to commit crime that the
citizen encounters over a year and P is the probability of actually
committing crime each time an opportunity arises. The presence of an
undercover police officer who provides an opportunity to commit
crime increases N (creates an additional opportunity to commit
crime), and depending on the strength of the inducement, it might
also increase P. Thus, the presence of the undercover would increase
E, as presumed by existing accounts of entrapment law.
Let us now look at the reference class of the predisposed defen-
dants (or professional criminals). If the crime expectancy for a drug
dealer on a day is E, then E = N*P, where N is the number of
opportunities the dealer encounters during the day (the number of
customers he meets) and P is the probability of actually making a
sale. Here too, the presence of police undercover customers’ may well
increase N (now there are more customers than before).34 We cannot
know for sure, however, how it affects P – this will depend on the
deterring effect of proactive policing (does it also cause criminals to
refrain from crime) and on the effectiveness of undercover operations.
As for the last, if the undercovers are more effective than other
33 Namely where the police raise significantly the number of opportunities.
34 See also Miceli, no. 13 above, which analyses the situation using conditional
probability. Yet as we shall see below, there may be cases in which N is not increased.
Bayesian analysis will show that in these cases too, the likelihood of commission will
often increase.
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customers in bringing about sales, their presence will increase P as
well, and then the overall crime expectancy will surely increase. If the
undercovers are as effective as other customers, their presence will not
change P, but since N is increased, the overall crime expectancy is still
increased. And if the undercovers are less effective than other cus-
tomers, their presence will reduce P, and the implications on the
overall expectancy of crime will then depend on the extent to which N
has been increased and the extent to which P has been decreased (so
the overall expectancy might increase, decrease, or stay the same). It
can already be noted here that police effectiveness does not neces-
sarily correlate with the strength of the inducement they offer: too
strong an inducement might raise the professional criminal’s suspi-
cion and actually decrease the probability of commission.35
Yet even if it is accepted that the increase in N (the number of
opportunities) affects the expectancy of crime commission, it could be
argued that more often than not N cannot be changed, simply be-
cause the defendant has as many opportunities to commit crime as he
can take (there is more demand for drugs than the drug dealer can
supply). Thus, the defendant will effectively have, say, 10 opportu-
nities to commit crime per day with or without the additional
opportunities provided by the police. Here, Bayes’s Theorem be-
comes a more effective tool of demonstrating the effects of proactive
policing.
35 Thomas Miceli has already used simple probabilistic tools in his economic
analysis of the law of entrapment. (Miceli, no. 13 above). He realizes that much
police pro-active action increases crime expectancy, but he seeks to distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate increases by distinguishing the allegedly legitimate in-
crease in N from the illegitimate increase in P. It is unclear why the enforcement costs
which D creates can be legitimately minimized by increasing D’s crime expectancy
through addition of opportunities but not through provision of a stronger induce-
ment to commit crime. Furthermore, Miceli’s analysis relies on a sharp distinction
between those who have decided to commit an offence (and hence create enforcement
costs) and those who have not, but it is doubtful whether this distinction accords
with reality. In reality, there are different levels of readiness to commit crime, and
accordingly different levels of resulting enforcement costs. Last, Miceli’s analysis
renders sweeping conclusions with respect to the implications of entrapment for the
likelihood of crime commission (i.e. the likelihood of commission is always increased
following entrapment because of the increase in N). This analysis does not take count




Bayes’s Theorem is another tool which demonstrates that police
proactive action does not merely shift the scene of crime. It does, in
fact, change (and often increases) the likelihood of crime commission.
In addition, Bayes’s Theorem can be used to calculate changes in the
probability of crime commission per opportunity to commit crime
(rather than the expectancy of crime per time unit). These changes are
of particular interest for a justice-based analysis of the law; they
usually – though not always - correlate with the changes in the ex-
pectancy of crime per time-unit which are more relevant for an eco-
nomic analysis of the law. When Bayes’s Theorem is used in this way,
it reveals all the range of factors affecting the changes in the likelihood
of commission following entrapment, thus demonstrating the limited
significance of changes in the number of opportunities, and also the
difficulty in evaluating the changes in probability for any given case.
Bayes’s Theorem can then be used to examine the changes in the
expectancy of crime per time unit following entrapment, thus reveal-
ing a small group of cases in which a justice-based analysis could
potentially have diverged from an economic analysis. For these rea-
sons, it is a beneficial tool for the purposes of the current investigation.
I have explained elsewhere how Bayes’s Theorem works.37 For
current purposes, we can proceed directly to explaining how it would
work in the context of entrapment. We can define an opportunity to
commit crime as an encounter’. Assume now that P(E|C) is the
probability that a given encounter in which the defendant has com-
mitted crime is with an entrapping undercover, and P(E|^C) is the
probability that a given encounter in which the defendant has not
36 Bruce Hay has used Bayes’s Theorem to discuss a different question in the
context of entrapment (Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and
Entrapment’, (2005) 70 MLR 387). For Hay, entrapment is justified when it provides
the criminal justice system with accurate information on whether D is a criminal, or
was D likely to have committed similar crimes absent police interventions. Bayes’s
Theorem is used to identify the likelihood that given the fact that D was entrapped,
D would have committed similar crimes absent police intervention (see especially pp.
404–409). Thus, the legitimacy of entrapment is examined based on a parameter
which is similar to the one suggested by Posner, and the difficulties it raises were
discussed above. This parameter assumes that if D was sufficiently likely to have
committed similar crimes absent police intervention, entrapment is justified; but it
does not explain how the higher likelihood of crime commission justifies increasing
this likelihood even further.
37 Liat Levanon, Sexual History Evidence in Sexual Assault Cases: A Critical
Reevaluation’, 64 (2012) University of Toronto Law Journal 609 at 365.
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committed crime is with an entrapping undercover. The term P(E|C)/
P(E|^C) is called the likelihood ratio’. The likelihood ratio for a
specific case of entrapment tells us whether entrapment has increased
or decreased the odds of the defendant committing the crime com-
pared to the average odds of commission, and by how much. The
question whether the odds of commission have increased or decreased
is determined by comparing the two abovementioned probabilities
(which one has higher value). The question by how much the odds
have changed is determined by dividing the two probabilities.38
In simple terms, the Theorem works as follows: First, the prior
odds of commission are calculated (the odds that a random person
commits crime, regardless of police action). The prior odds of com-
mission are calculated by way of tracing the relevant class of persons
(in our case, predisposed defendants and law-abiding citizens) and
then dividing the probability of commission within this class by the
probability of non-commission within it. This ratio will be termed Q.
Next, the inducing power of entrapment is calculated. The inducing
power of entrapment is reflected in the abovementioned likelihood
ratio. Assuming we can calculate the likelihood ratio, we can now say
what the posterior odds of commission’ in a given case are (i.e., the
odds of commission given the entrapment) and compare them with Q
(the prior odds of commission) to see by how much they have
changed.
The proposed argument focuses on the likelihood ratio in order to
determine whether entrapment increases the likelihood of commis-
sion. Focusing on the likelihood ratio, it is evident that entrapment
would tend to increase the odds of commission if the probability of
tracing it is higher assuming that crime was committed. Only in this
case, the likelihood ratio of entrapment would tend to increase the
odds of commission. We should therefore ask which of the two
probabilities is higher.
38 Another way of working with the Theorem in this context is looking at P(C|E)/
P(C|^E). Only where this value is equal to or smaller than 1, entrapment does not
increase the likelihood of commission per opportunity. According to the Theorem,
P(C|E)=(P(E|C)*P0(C))/P0(E), where P0 stands for prior probabilities. In addition,
P(C|^E)=P(^E|C)*P0(C))/P0(^E). If we divide the two, we get P(C|E)/P(C|^E)=
(P(E|C)*P0(^E))/P(^E|C)*P0(E). And so, (P(E|C)/P(^E|C))*(P0(^E)/P0(E))<1
where P(E|C)/P(^E|C)<P0(E)/P0(^E). This means that entrapment would not in-
crease the odds of commission per opportunity only where the portion of crimes
detected through entrapment is smaller than the portion encounters which are
entrapments. It can be shown that this condition hardly ever exists, and that in any
case it is very hard to know if it exists in a given case.
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Here too, we should first identify a relevant reference class. Next,
we should model assessments of the inducing value of entrapment,
examining different types of entrapment and different strengths of
inducement (such as entrapments providing exceptionally attractive
opportunities to commit crime or entrapments providing a normal
opportunity to commit crime).
2.3.3 The Reference Class of Law-Abiding Citizens’
We can begin by showing briefly and informally that, as assumed by
existing accounts of entrapment, where the reference class is defined
as non-predisposed’ or law-abiding defendants, then at least under
some limiting assumptions regarding the prevalence of opportunities
to commit crime entrapment would often increase the probability of
commission, and it would probably increase this probability pro-
portionately to the strength of the inducement presented.
Let us assume that the police deploy successful random entrap-
ment in 2 out of 10 commissions by non-predisposed citizens. The
probability of entrapment assuming commission would be 0.2.
Now we have to compare the above probability with the proba-
bility of entrapment assuming a decision not to take an opportunity
to commit crime. Let us assume here that the non-predisposed citizen
encounters a significant number of opportunities to commit the rel-
evant crime (say, to shoplift, to rape, or to purchase some drugs).39
Such a citizen makes many no commission’ decisions every day – the
vast majority of which are taken without entrapment in the back-
ground, and a small minority of which are taken on the background
of entrapment. Hence the probability of tracing entrapment in cases
of no commission’ decision is fairly low – it may well be lower than
0.2. In such cases, entrapment increases the probability of commis-
sion.
This analysis further suggests that the increase in the probability
of commission following entrapment will be higher the more effective
39 Squires (supra no. 3) assumes that law abiding citizens do not encounter many
opportunities to commit crime. He further assumes that when encountering such
opportunities, law abiding citizens would tend to take them. This leads him to
criticize the law which often prohibits entrapment of law abiding citizens. However,
probabilistic analysis would demonstrate that under these assumptions, entrapment
may or may not increase the likelihood of commission; and that the only assump-
tions under which we can be sure that entrapment does not increase the likelihood of
crime is that law abiding citizens would tend not to take such opportunities (in
contrast with Squires’ assumptions).
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the police are, or the stronger or more exceptionally attractive the
inducement is. The more exceptionally attractive the inducement the
police offer, the more cases will there be of tempted citizens, and so
(1) the likelihood of tracing entrapment assuming commission would
increase; and (2) the likelihood of tracing entrapment assuming non-
commission would decrease, since there would be hardly any no
commission’ decisions taken on the background of entrapment (as
the inducement will bring about a yes’ decision). Thus, if the
inducement is particularly strong, the probability of tracing entrap-
ment where a decision not to commit is taken might become very low.
Accordingly, in such cases entrapment raises the probability of
commission even further.
If this analysis is correct, then the law’s prohibition on entrapment
of non-predisposed, law-abiding citizens seems justifiable in terms of
cost-effectiveness and of fairness: it is not cost-effective and also
unfair to raise the probability of a citizen committing crime, and then
to sanction her for the commission.
2.3.4 The Reference Class of Predisposed Defendants’
We can now examine a different reference class, namely the reference
class of predisposed or ready to commit crime’ defendants. Let us
look at the likelihood ratio in this case:
First, we have to calculate the likelihood of entrapment assuming
commission. We can assume, for the purposes of providing a starting
point, that the police deploy successful targeted entrapment (suc-
cessful entrapment of predisposed Ds) in 3 of 10 cases of commission
by such Ds. In that case, the probability of entrapment assuming
commission would be 3/10 or 0.3.
Now we have to compare the above probability with the proba-
bility of entrapment assuming a decision by the predisposed offender
to skip an opportunity to commit crime. Here, modelling the relevant
assessments would be more difficult, as the assessments are harder to
make. The probabilities of entrapment in cases of a decision to re-
frain from crime commission can range; and they would range
regardless of the question whether the defendant is a fully occupied’
criminal or not. The question concerns the number of decisions to
skip an opportunity to commit crime which were actually unsuc-
cessful entrapments. This figure is unknown, and various estimations
are plausible. Estimating that 1 in 10 non-commissions by predis-
posed offenders are unsuccessful entrapments could be just as plau-
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sible as assessing that 5 in 10 non-commissions are unsuccessful
entrapments. And so, the probability of entrapment assuming non-
commission might be higher than the probability of entrapment
assuming commission (0.3), or it might be lower than this likelihood.
There is hardly ever a way of knowing if entrapment did not increase
the probability of commission for the predisposed criminal just theway
it increases it for the law-abiding citizen. The only thing that can be said
is that the less cautions or hesitant or otherwise reluctant to jump on
every opportunity to commit crime D is, and the more effective the
police are, the more likely it is that entrapment indeed increases the
probability of commission.40 Accordingly, it is impossible to conclude
that entrapment of the predisposed criminal is legitimate, or even that
entrapment is normally legitimate except for cases where the police are
potentially highly effective in bringing about crime, for example be-
cause they use excessive inducement. Entrapment may well be illegiti-
mate also where police actions are potentially less effective, but D is
insufficiently cautious. Accordingly, entrapment is always at least
suspected of increasing the likelihood of commission, even for the
professional criminal. Formal analysis could show that it often does
increase this likelihood.41
This model could be developed further to examine whether
entrapment changes the likelihood of commission not per encounter,
but per time unit (the crime expectancy). In this case, it would
examine the same variable that was examined above using simple
probabilistic tools, and which is more relevant for an economic
evaluation of the law. Here, Bayesian analysis would show that if
entrapment does not increase the number of opportunities to commit
crime per time unit (the number of encounters), the likelihood of
crime commission per time unit will increase if P(C|E) is higher than
P(C|^E), i.e. if an encounter between D and the police is more likely
to bring about crime than an encounter between D and other ac-
40 Notably, the level of police activity also affects D’s decisions in the same
direction: the more active the police are, the more suspicious D would become, and
the more opportunities per day he would choose to pass.
41 For example, where the prior probability of commission is 0.5, the probability
that an encounter is with an undercover is 0.25, and all entrapments are successful,
Bayesian analysis would show that entrapment increases the probability of com-
mission. Where only 60% of entrapments are successful, as long as D’s likelihood of
passing an opportunity to commit crime is lower than 0.75, entrapment would still
increase the likelihood of commission.
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tors.42 If entrapment does increase the number of encounters per time
unit, then the likelihood of crime commission per time unit may
increase even if P(C|E) < P(C|^E) – i.e. even if an encounter between
D and the police is less likely to bring about crime than an encounter
between D and other actors.43
Thus, where the likelihood of crime commission per time unit (or
the expectancy of crime) is calculated, additional conclusions which
may be relevant for economic evaluation of the law are revealed.
Here too, in most cases entrapment would increase the expectancy of
crime, and the rare cases in which it would not increase the crime
expectancy are hard to identify in advance since their determining
characteristics are contingent (police effectiveness and defendant’s
tendency to skip opportunities to commit crime). Under some very
limiting conditions, which are not identified by existing law and are
indeed hard to identify in advance, entrapment may be legitimate
from an economic perspective (in addition to a justice perspective, as
identified above). This would be the case where entrapment increases
neither the number of opportunities to commit crime nor the likeli-
hood of commission per opportunity (taking into consideration the
factors mentioned above). More importantly, the analysis per time
unit also indicates that there is a narrow group of cases where en-
trapment might be illegitimate from an economic perspective, even
though it is legitimate from a perspective of justice. This would be the
case where entrapment increases the number of opportunities to
commit crime so significantly that even given a decrease in the
probability of commission per opportunity (taking count of the fac-
tors mentioned above), the likelihood of commission per time unit
would still increase.
42 It is assumed that the encounters are independent from one another (which is
normally the case). In a world without entrapments P0(C)=P0(^E). We can term this
value X. If over a day the drug dealer has 10 successful encounters, his crime ex-
pectancy is 10X. Now assume that the police replace 5 of the real encounters. P0(C)
= (P(C/E)+P(C/^E))/2. We can term this value Y. The crime expectancy per day
will be 10Y. We should now examine in which conditions 10Y will be higher than
10X, and it is evident that this will be the case where P(C/E)>P(C/^E).
43 Assume again like ibid., namely that in a world without entrapments
P0(C)=P0(^E)= X; and then that the drug dealer has 10 successful encounters per
day, and his crime expectancy is 10X. Now assume that the police add 5 further
encounters. If, say, only one of these encounters is successful, it is possible that police
activity would decrease the probability of commission per opportunity, yet it would
still increase the probability of commission per time unit (since there is one addi-
tional commission).
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We can now examine whether the power of the threat or promise
offered by the police plays a role in this analysis. The nature of the
inducement is one non-determinative factor affecting the outcomes of
the analysis. The assumption underlying the law of entrapment is that
the stronger and more exceptional the inducement police offer, the
more effective police action is in bringing about crime commission,
and the less legitimate the entrapment is. There is, however, good
reason to assume that at least as far as the professional or experienced
criminal is concerned, police action would be effective where the
police best imitate the normal settings of crime, or merely provide a
normal opportunity to commit crime; and it would be less effective
where the police offer incentives which are stronger than normal
hence raising the experienced criminal’s suspicion and leading her to
refrain from crime commission. Accordingly, there is reason to think
that police action changes the likelihood of crime in a way different to
the one assumed by the literature and the courts: when providing
normal opportunity for the predisposed criminal, it actually raises the
likelihood of him committing the offence, and hence this is the case in
which the legitimacy of police action should be put in question.
Clearly, such a hypothesis requires empirical support. Yet in the
absence empirical research, the least that can be said is that we do not
know that this hypothesis is any weaker than the other hypothesis.
To summarize, it is impossible to know how exactly police action
affects the likelihood of commission per opportunity or per time unit
by the predisposed defendant in any given case; and there is reason to
think that the more normal’ the opportunity provided by the police,
the higher the chances that police action actually increased the like-
lihood of commission per opportunity and per time unit for the
predisposed defendant, just the way powerful threats or promises do
for the law-abiding citizen.
2.4 Interim Conclusions
We have seen that there is no essential connection between D’s
readiness to commit crime or the exceptionality of the opportunity
provided by the police, and the changes in the likelihood of crime
commission per opportunity or per time-unit following entrapment.
Entrapment potentially increases the likelihood of commission for
professional criminals provided with normal opportunity to commit
crime as well as for law-abiding citizens provided with exceptional
opportunity to commit crime (at least under some plausible
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assumptions).44 In the vast majority of cases, this potential increase
exists both for the likelihood of commission per opportunity and for
the likelihood of commission per time-unit. Accordingly, the dis-
tinction between the two classes of defendants and the distinction
between the two types of police action cannot be used to differentiate
legitimate police operation from illegitimate entrapment on economic
grounds or on grounds of justice. A different basis for the differen-
tiation should therefore be sought after. After examining a possible
objection to the analysis which has been proposed thus far, the next
part of the article will propose such a basis.
2.5 Possible Objections to Focusing on the Increase in Probability of
Crime
One possible objection is that the increase in the probability of crime
commission, and thus also in D’s punishment expectancy, is justifi-
able where immaterial or marginal. Economically, where this increase
is low and the decrease in harm expectancy is high, entrapment is
justified. In addition, it is just to impose on the defendants marginal
burdens to neutralize the risks she poses. Thus, the real question is
not whether entrapment increases the probability of commission, but
by how much.
One has to distinguish between statistical significance and mate-
riality. It was demonstrated earlier that the likelihood ratio indicates
whether entrapment changes the odds of commission: where the
probability of tracing entrapment given commission is higher than
the probability of tracing entrapment given non-commission (the
likelihood ratio is below 1), entrapment increases the odds of com-
mission. Yet not every such increase is to be considered statistically
significant: a likelihood ratio which is higher than 0.5 (and lower than
2) is usually considered as indicative of an insignificant change of
odds.45 Thus, if it could be shown that entrapment increases the odds
of commission only insignificantly, the objection would have been
valid. This, however, is not the case. As we saw, it is impossible to
know the exact value of the likelihood ratio in this context, though
there are reasons to think that it is lower than 1, and similarly, it is
plausible that it would be lower than 0.5 in some if not in most cases.
44 And it can decrease this likelihood for both classes in some circumstances.
45 The exact values would depend on the question what probability of type I error’
is considered tolerable (rejection of a null hypothesis that is true, or concluding that
entrapment does not increase commission odds where in fact it does).
LIAT LEVANON56
But the objection goes further than that: it argues that even if the
increase in theoddsof commission is probabilistically significant, it is still
often too small to have normative significance. This objection gives rise
to several difficulties. First, the assumption that small increases are jus-
tifiable and high increases are unjustifiable is not valid. In some cases it
seems justifiable to increase the probability of commission significantly
through entrapment. For example, entrapment of a potential murderer
whose likelihood of commission is 35% seems justifiable even if it in-
creases the probability of commission to 80% (assuming that there are
no other means to prevent him from murdering). In the same manner,
entrapment sometimes seems unjustifiable evenwhere the increase in the
probability of commission is low. For example, inducing tax evasion
seems fairly objectionable even where the inducement does not raise the
probability of commission significantly.
Second and relatedly, the increase in probability might be high even
for the professional criminal who encounters many opportunities to
commit crime, since, for example, he might be a picky or hesitant
criminal who takes only a small portion of the many opportunities
available to him. In other words, the question whether the increase in
probability is material can only be determined in the context of the
specific offender-police relation, and it would be affected by charac-
teristic of the particular offender and of the particular police under-
cover (how effective she is). Accordingly, ensuring that the increase in
the probability of commission is immaterial is difficult both prospec-
tively and retrospectively. In such conditions, there are reasons to as-
sume in favour of the defendant that the increase is material.
Third, this line of argument does not take into account the pre-
existing correlation between crime expectancy and punishment ex-
pectancy. This prior correlation is supposed to be cost-effective and
just. Entrapment increases the punishment expectancy beyond the
level which is supposed to be cost-effective and just, and it does so
without explaining why this level is actually not cost-effective or
unjust in the relevant case. Thus, the objection is counter-intuitive
and presumes that which requires explanation.
It could also be argued that the question is not whether the police
increased the probability of commission, but whether this probability
was high enough even absent police intervention. According to this line
of argument, the law of entrapment should direct the fact finder to find
out whether it is possible to be convinced beyond reasonable doubt
that D would have committed a similar offence absent police inter-
vention (the hypothetical offence); or in other words, the fact finder has
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to determine whether the probability of D having committed the
hypothetical offence meet the beyond reasonable doubt’ standard. If
the answer is in the positive, entrapment would be deemed legitimate:
the difference between the actual entrapment-offence and the hypo-
thetical offence becomes normatively insignificant, and we can think of
the hypothetical offence as having been committed beyond reasonable
doubt (or to import the actuality of the entrapment-offence to the
platform of the hypothetical offence). If the answer is in the negative,
entrapment would be illegitimate, as we cannot think of the hypo-
thetical offence as having been committed beyond reasonable doubt
(or import the actuality of the entrapment offence to the platform of
the hypothetical offence). Accordingly, existing legal distinctions
cannot be criticized on the basis that they fail to account for the in-
creased probability of commission in all cases of police intervention.
If this understanding is taken on board, existing law can be jus-
tified on the following lines: the courts actually seek to establish the
probability of commission absent police interference; and they do so
by reference to D’s predisposition, to the strength of the inducement,
or to the exceptionality of the opportunity offered by the police. All
of these tests reflect the valid assumption that if the settings remain
the same, people would tend to repeat some courses of conduct in
very high likelihood46 (or, presumably, beyond reasonable doubt);
thus those who are used to committing crime in certain settings would
repeat this conduct in the same settings in very high likelihood; and
those who do not commit crime in normal settings would in very high
likelihood not commit crime as long as the settings are not changed.
Accordingly, the first should be found guilty, and second – not guilty.
Under these assumptions, existing law makes good sense.
46 The assumption of repetition is widely accepted amongst researchers of human
psychology. According to this assumption, a combination of personal and situational
factors would lead to repetition of some courses of conduct. The relative weight of
personal and situational factors in causing action might change, and some people tend
to attune their conduct to the situation more than others, but a well-defined rule of
repetition can still be identified. See e.g. Paul L Wachtel, Psychodynamics, Behavior
Therapy, and the Implacable Experimenter: An Inquiry into the Consistency of Per-
sonality’ (1973) 82(2) Journal of Abnormal Psychology 324; Mark Snyder, Self-
Monitoring Processes’, in L Berkowitz, ed, Advances in Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy (NewYork: Academic Press, 1979), vol 12 at 85; Daryl J Bem&AndreaAllen, On
Predicting Some of the People Some of the Time: The Search for Cross-Situational
Consistencies inBehavior’ (1974) 81(6) Psychological Review 506; LeonardBerkowitz,
Aggression, Its Causes, Consequences, and Control (New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 1993)
128–9; Norman S Endler & J McVicker Hunt, Triple Interaction Variance in the S-R
Inventory of Anxiousness’, (1968) 27 Perceptual and Motor Skills 1098.
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But only just so. First, because there are good and familiar reasons
not to convict based on the assumption of repetition,47 the main of
which are the biasing effect of this assumption, and the lack of
incentive for predisposed’ defendants to refrain from crime if con-
victions can be based on this assumption.48 Second and relatedly, it is
unclear that the assumption of repetition is indeed so strong, namely
that people repeat courses of conduct at such a high probability that
it meets the beyond reasonable doubt’ standard (but at the same time
we do know that fact finders might give exaggerated weight to the
assumption of repetition). Third, there is a difficulty in convicting
based on integration of a fictional offence with a real one. We know
that the fictional offence is, as the case is, fictional. We know that it
has not been committed, though its probability of commission
allegedly crossed the criminal threshold. The beyond reasonable
doubt’ standard is supposed to establish knowledge (of beyond rea-
sonable doubt) that an offence was committed. Where it cannot
establish such knowledge, and the case remains one of a theoretical
probability that has not been actualized, the beyond reasonable
ground’ standard is an insufficient ground for conviction – with or
without the actuality of a different offence. Accordingly, this line of
argument does not provide foundation for determining the legitimacy
of entrapment based only on the likelihood of similar crime com-
mission absent entrapment.
III PART II: A POSSIBLE FOUNDATION FOR A LAW OF
ENTRAPMENT
3.1 Burdens and Their Reallocation
Offenders create risks for, and place burdens on, their victims and on
general society. The law designs mechanisms which ensure that the
burdens offenders create are justly reallocated. This normally entails
47 For a comprehensive account of possible justifications for the regulation of the
introduction of character evidence’ demonstrating past similar conduct see David P.
Leonard, In Defence of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of the
Rule against Trial by Character’, (1997–1998) 73 Indiana Law Journal 1161.
48 See Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial’,
(2001) 101 Columbia Law Review 1227; David Enoch and Talia Fisher, Sense and
Sensitivity’: Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence’, (2015)
67 Stanford Law Review 585, section III(B).
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undoing the burden-imposition at the cost of imposing another
burden on the offender which does not exceed the overall original
burden the offender had created.49 The law sets a range of realloca-
tion mechanisms, including permissions to deploy burdensome pre-
emptive means to prevent commission of offences, permissions to
deploy force to stop the commission of offences, and to the extent
that punishment is perceived as corrective also permissions to impose
criminal sanctions.50 The different mechanisms take count of the
weight of the burden that requires reallocation. The heavier the
burden that the offender creates, the heavier the burden that the law
would permit imposing on the offender with the prospect of relieving
the original burden.
Burden reallocation is connected, but not identical, to risk man-
agement. Risk management theories consider legal rules as mecha-
nisms designed to best manage different social risks. Risk
management is considered as morally neutral or as part of a utili-
tarian ethics; yet it has been criticized for concealing moral premises
through the definition and evaluation of risks.51 Burden reallocation
is neither morally neutral nor utilitarian: it is rooted in distributive
justice, and it is the other side of redistribution of resources.52 More
often than not just redistribution of burdens overlaps with good (and
indeed cost effective) risk management, but this is not necessarily the
case. Thus, for example, risk management allows for risks of crime to
be pushed onto potential victims where this is the most cost-effective
49 See Liat Levanon, ‘‘Punishment and Self-Defence: A Comment on Victor Ta-
dros’’ ‘‘The Ends of Harm’’’, 5 (2012) JRSLM. REV. LEGAL STUD. 75–88, and compare
with Victor Tadros, Replies’ (Book Symposium on Victor Tadros’ The Ends of
Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law) (2012) 5 Jerusalem Review of Legal
Studies 89. Another question is whether and how the imposition of criminal pun-
ishment can reallocate burdens. An initial solution is indicated in Liat Levanon,
Criminal Punishment as a Restorative Practice’ (2015) 18 New Criminal Law Re-
view 537.
50 See Liat Levanon, Personhoood, Equality, and a Possible Justification for
Criminal Punishment’ (2014) 27 THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
439; and Liat Levanon, Criminal Punishment as a Restorative Practice’, ibid.
51 For a comprehensive review of risk management and its moral aspects see
Richard V. Ericson and Aaron Doyle, Risk and Morality (University of Toronto
Press, Toronto, Buffalo, and London: 2003).
52 See also Levanon, Punishment and Self Defense’, no. 49 above; and Levanon,
Criminal Punishment as a Restorative Practice’, no. 49 above.
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way to prevent crime,53 while from the point of view of burden
reallocation such a move would be contestable and will require fur-
ther justification.54
The weight of the burden that the offender creates depends on a
variety of factors. One such factor is the type of offence (directed at
specific victims or victimless). Another such factor is the stage of
commission (developing intent and planning the offence, execution,
and completion55). These factors are connected: the exact burdens
created at each of these points of the criminal operation would de-
pend on the type of offence.56 When it comes to offences directed
against victims, the burden created at the pre-completion stages is
particularly heavy: where commission has not yet begun, D not only
places on V the offence’s harm expectancy, but also puts V in a
position of uncertainty, having to decide of an effective response to
53 Compare with Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case
for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault’ (1994) 82 California Law Re-
view 1181; and Omri Ben Shachar and Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal
Incentives for Private Precautions against Crime’, (1995) 11 Journal of Law, Eco-
nomics, and Organization 434. The authors argue that some burdens are appropri-
ately placed on potential victims (namely where the combination of private
protection means with governmental protection means provides optimal enforce-
ment). My argument is that this is only part of the story: optimal enforcement means
that the burdens on potential victims are pushed back to the offender, to the extent
that it is possible to do so, through these radical governmental or private defensive
mechanisms.
54 Hence, for example, the state cannot oblige home owners to install locks. The
argument advanced here is that where a potential victim has been motivated to
installing expensive locks, the law should push this burden back to D, for example by
being more permissive with respect to entrapment of D or by punishing D who broke
such a lock more severely than another D who entered an open door. This argument
is consistent with Ben-Shachar and Harel’s conclusions with respect to optimal
sentencing (ibid.), but for reasons different from the ones they provide.
55 Different legal mechanisms work to reallocate different burdens created at
different stages of the operation. Some of the mechanisms are designed to reallocate
the burdens created following the completion of the offence. These include mainly
punitive mechanisms (the permission to impose criminal sanctions and sentencing
rules and guidelines). Other mechanisms are designed to reallocate the burdens
created prior to completion. These are the defensive mechanisms. Substantive
criminal law defences such as self-defence and prevention of crime reallocate burdens
created during commission but before completion; and public law rules and, to an
extent, also rules of evidence regulating police action reallocate burdens created
before commission has begun. Considering the fact that the burdens created at
different points of the operation are of different weights, each of these mechanisms
would permit the imposition of different burdens on D.
56 See also Levanon, Punishment and Self Defence’, no. 49 above.
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the threat without knowing the full scope of the threat or indeed the
exact likelihood that the threat will materialize. Thus, for example,
the to-be-robber imposes on his potential victims the burden of
improving their security measures (locks, alarms, etc.), inherent in
which is the burden of deciding the extent of such improvements
without knowing the exact intentions and capabilities of the robber
and when being under stress. The to-be-robber further imposes on his
potential victims the burden of considering and deciding on potential
self-defensive measures if and when attacked, without knowing the
scale of attack she might be facing and the exact likelihood of such
attack– should she prepare herself for a physical attack? If so, would
arms be involved? Of which types? The burdens that D puts on V
grow further as D proceeds with his plans and starts the actual
commission. The likelihood of commission then grows to a point of
almost 100% (once the robber has entered the bank holding his gun,
the likelihood of him withdrawing becomes negligent). In addition,
the threat becomes imminent hence requiring quick decision making
in conditions of distress and some uncertainty. Once the commission
has been completed, the burdens may well decrease: while the like-
lihood of commission is now 100%, the burdening elements of
uncertainty and imminence are no longer present. The extent of the
burden involved is already known, and there is no need to decide on
preventive response without knowing the extent of the risk and when
under stress and time pressures.57 Thus, the burden comes only to the
offence’s harm expectancy. To conclude, when it comes to offences
against victims, the burdens D puts on V in the pre-completion stages
go beyond the offence’s harm expectancy; after completion, these
burdens decrease.
Things are different when it comes to victimless offences (offences
against the public or the environment, or offences committed by two
consenting parties). Here, the burdens that D places on others in the
pre-completion stages are lower. D does not put anyone in the dif-
ficult position of the attacked victim with all the implications of this.
Accordingly, the burden D creates before and during commission is
composed mainly of the offence’s harm expectancy. This burden is
close to the burden created following completion, with the only dif-
ference being in the likelihood of completion which is certain only
57 Considering this decrease in burdens, the permitted punitive response would
hardly ever be as weighty as the permitted defensive responses. See Levanon, Pu-
nishment and Self Defense’, no. 49 above.
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post-completion. Thus, in victimless offences the burdens D creates
come only to the offence’s harm expectancy.
3.2 Entrapment and Self-Defence: Burden Reallocation Prior to
Completion
The law of entrapment works prior to and throughout the commis-
sion of the offence. Accordingly, it is a defensive mechanism which
works at the pre-completion stages of the criminal operation, and it is
comparable not only to rules regulating police action, but also to
substantive defences. Specifically, entrapment and self-defence have
similar theoretical foundations.
Leo Katz has already noted the similarities between the two.58 His
analysis is based on the actio libera in causa doctrine, and it focuses
on comparison between provoked self-defence and illegitimate
entrapment. Katz notes that [a]ctually private entrapment, as illus-
trated by provocation self-defence, and governmental entrapment are
treated analogously provided one knows what to look for. Situations
in which the motivations of a private entrapper are exactly like those
of the government are treated in exactly the same way’.59 Katz’s
analysis leads him to compare the loss of the self-defence defence
following provocation to the loss of the defence [the government] is
usually able to make for putting someone in jail, namely that he
deserved it’.60 The analogy seems to require further elucidation with
respect to the way desert works as a defence for the government’s
punitive act. But the analogy between entrapment and self defence is
nevertheless a valid analogy, and it can be based on different grounds.
Self-defence and entrapment are defensive mechanisms that negate
the liability of actors (the victim or the police undercover) for bur-
dens they impose on others (the attacker or the entrapped defendant).
When self-defense or entrapment are used, the outcome for those
against whom they are used might be mitigation of sentence – either
personal mitigation for the attacker who was badly hurt by her vic-
tim’s self-defensive act, or general mitigation for the defendant who
fell for the police’s entrapment.
Since entrapment and self-defence are both defensive reallocation
mechanisms, they should be designed according to the same princi-
58 Leo Katz, Entrapment through the Lens of Actio Libera in Causa’, (2013) 7
Criminal Law and Philosophy 587.
59 ibid. at 595.
60 ibid.
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ples. Both mechanisms are aimed at neutralizing the risks D creates
prior to completion of the offence at the price of placing burdens on
D which do not exceed the original risks D created. Accordingly,
both mechanisms have to reflect the reallocation of not only the
offence’s harm expectancy, but also any additional burdens D creates
prior to completion, if there are such additional burdens. The exact
nature of the additional burdens might be different for each of these
mechanisms, and so might be the offence’s harm expectancy. But still,
the principles of reallocation would be similar. Therefore, it should be
possible to deduce from principles governing the use of self-defensive
force to principles of police entrapment.
We should therefore begin by examining the principles governing
the use of self-defensive force. When it comes to offences directed
against victims, the amount of permissible force in self-defence re-
flects the abovementioned heavy burdens D creates for V once
commission has begun and the now high probability of completion.
Considering the extent and weight of these burdens, the amount of
permissible force is high: extreme and even lethal self-defensive force
is permitted.61 But for victimless offences, extreme self-defensive force
usually becomes irrelevant, as there is no victim who needs to defend
herself. This is consistent with the lower burden D imposes in such
offences (due to the absence of victims). Some extensions of justifi-
catory self-defence, such as prevention of crime or even general
necessity, might be relevant; but they would normally not permit the
use of radical force in the context of victimless offences - no one can
legitimately e.g. kill D who commits an offence against the public,
simply because D has not created the risks that would underlie a
permission to use lethal force at the time of the commission of the
offence.62 The same principles can be applied, with necessary modi-
fications, for the regulation of police entrapment.
61 For an account of the cases in which the use of lethal self-defensive force is
permitted see Fiona Leverick, Killing in Self Defence (Oxford University Press,
Oxford: 2006).
62 The permission to use limited force in such defences reflects only the offence’s
harm expectancy, and not any additional burdens like the ones created in offences
against victims.
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3.3 Entrapment: Distinguishing Offences Against Victims
from Victimless Offences
In contrast with current law and much of the existing literature,63 the
proposed analysis implies that, like radical self-defensive force,
entrapment would usually be legitimate in the context of offences
directed against individual victims. The burdens D creates for
potential victims prior to completion of the offence go beyond the
offence’s harm expectancy; they are of several types, and they are
high in their accumulation. Accordingly, the use of burdensome
means of reallocation is legitimate. Much like radical self-defensive
force, entrapment is such a burdensome means of reallocation.
Entrapment increases the probability of commission and thus also
D’s punishment expectancy in proportion with the additional bur-
dens D has placed on V. Indeed, the increase in D’s punishment
expectancy cannot legitimately be as burdensome as self-defensive
force. The burdens D creates before commission has begun are still
not as high as they would be after commission has begun. But still,
the burdens are of the same types, and in their accumulation they are
high enough to justify an increase in D’s punishment expectancy
through entrapment.
For this reason, we should have no special difficulty with
entrapment of a potential serial killer or robber, even where the
likelihood of commission is, say, only 35%. While we can say that
such a potential offender is actually unlikely to go ahead and commit
the offence, it still seems justifiable for the police to use entrapment to
neutralize whatever risk there is of him committing the offence nev-
ertheless. Entrapment of such defendants would work in a way
similar to self-defence. The same way the robber exposes himself to
self-defensive force which is more radical than the robbery’s harm
expectancy or the correlating punishment expectancy, the to-be-
robber exposes himself to preventive means which are more bur-
densome than the offence’s harm expectancy or the correlating
punishment expectancy. The grounds for permitting entrapment of
defendants who create risks to individual victims are similar to the
grounds for permitting the use of radical self-defensive force against
such defendants.
This does not mean that all the burdens that potential victims
carry should be reallocated to the defendant through entrapment;
only burdens carried by reasonable, if not fully rational, potential
63 See Tanovich, no. 7 above, 417; Redmayne, no. 7 above, 157.
THE LAW OF POLICE ENTRAPMENT 65
victims should be reallocated. The uncertainty with respect to the
extent of the risk the defendant poses is burdensome for perfectly
rational potential victims; and it might become more burdensome the
less perfectly rational potential victims are (the irrationally anxious
potential victim would over-prepare for the defendant’s potential
offences to an exaggerated extent). As behavioural economics has
demonstrated, potential victims would be irrational to a pre-
dictable extent: they would, for example, overestimate the likelihood
of memorable events, and accordingly the more preoccupied with
crime or victimhood they are, the more irrationally anxious will they
be.64 The legal system would therefore have to identify the burden for
the reasonable, if not fully rational, potential victim and to reallocate
this burden (and only this burden) to the defendant through
entrapment.65
Yet in the context of victimless offences, where the question of
entrapment is often sharpened, entrapment would be harder to jus-
tify. Just the way the absence of special risks for victims means that
the use of radical self-defensive force becomes irrelevant and the use
of radical private preventive force becomes illegitimate, the absence
of such risks bears on the legitimacy of entrapment. The burdens that
D can legitimately be made to carry prior to completion of victimless
offences are only as high as the offence’s original harm expectancy
(the harm expectancy given D’s original likelihood of commission).
Yet entrapment in such circumstances would amount to increasing
the likelihood of commission and thus D’s punishment expectancy;
and the increase is imposed without D creating burdens which might
justify it. Entrapment would thus increase the overall risk D creates
and then make him carry the new increased risk. The law of
64 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1982), Availability: A Heuristic for
Judging Frequency and Probability’, in Daniel Kahneman et al. (eds), Judgment
Under Un-certainty: Heuristics and Biases 163, at 164. See also Alon Harel, Be-
havioural Analysis of Criminal Law: A Survey’, 2 (2014) Bergen Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminal Justice 32; Richard H. McAdams and Thomas S. Ulen, Behav-
ioral Criminal Law and Economics’, U of Chicago Law and Economics, Olin
Working Paper No. 440; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 244; U
Illinois Law and Economics Research Paper No. LE08-035 (2008). For analysis of
the implications of behavioural economics for evaluation of offenders’ behaviour see
for example Nuno Garoupa, Behavioural Economics Analysis of Crime: A Critical
Review’, 15 (2003) European Journal of Law and Economics 5.
65 Here too, entrapment bears similarity to self-defense, where an unreasonable
and disproportional defensive response might have implications not only for the
actor’s liability but also, potentially, for the attacker’s sentence (which might be
significantly reduced to reflect the excessive force she has already been subjected to).
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entrapment should therefore allow taking count of the unwarranted
increase in D’s punishment expectancy.
3.4 Entrapment as a Mitigating Factor
The law of entrapment can take count of unwarranted or exaggerated
increases in the likelihood of commission and in D’s punishment
expectancy in the sentencing stage. The proposed analysis can thus
provide theoretical support for the now-marginalized English con-
ceptualization of entrapment as a mitigating factor. Until recent
years, English law was governed by the principles of R v Sang,66
where Lord Fraser famously stated that when Eve, taxed with having
eaten the forbidden fruit, replied the serpent beguiled me’, her excuse
was, at most, a plea in mitigation…’.67 This position allows place for
the courts to take count of considerations of burden reallocation. In
the context of offences directed against victims, there may be cases
where the police increase the likelihood of commission significantly,
resulting in high increase in D’s punishment expectancy. Where the
court considers this increase higher than the extra-burdens D had
placed on V, it can correct’ this by mitigating the sentence. In the
context of victimless offences, the police increase the likelihood of
commission, and hence the expectancy of punishment, in the absence
of extra-burdens created by D. D is thus exposed to a higher burden
than she has created. The courts can correct’ this too by decreasing
D’s punishment expectancy through mitigation. The more the police
increased the likelihood of commission, the lower would the sentence
be, possibly to the point of no punishment at all in appropriate cases.
Such an approach resonates with Talia Fisher’s proposal to im-
pose probabilistic punishment that takes into account the likelihood
that the defendant indeed committed the crime.68 Fisher seeks to
challenge the normative desirability of the binary all-or-nothing
sentencing paradigm by showing that the uniformity of punishment
in the epistemic space above the reasonable doubt threshold and the
absence of any punishment below this threshold are likely to impair
66 [1980] AC 402.
67 ibid., 446. See also Browning v. J. W. H. Watson {Rochester) Ltd. [1953]
1 W.L.R. 1172; Birtles (1969) 53 Cr.App.R. 469.
68 Talia Fisher, Constitutionalism and the Criminal Law: Rethinking Criminal
Trial Bifurcation’, (2011) 61 The University of Toronto Law Journal 811.
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ex-ante deterrence goal’.69 Like in Fisher’s model, the proposed ap-
proach to entrapment takes the likelihood of commission into ac-
count in the determination of punishment. Yet unlike Fisher’s model,
the proposed approach is not based on considerations of deterrence
(though it is not inconsistent with such considerations). Furthermore,
the proposed approach does not give rise to the same constitutional
objection to which Fisher’s proposal gives rise, namely that it com-
promises the beyond reasonable doubt’ standard.70 In the context of
entrapment, the entrapment offence, for which punishment is im-
posed, is proved to have been committed beyond reasonable doubt.
The factor taken into account is the changes in D’s punishment ex-
pectancy, which partly depend on D’s original likelihood of com-
mission.
The proposed approach can further settle some possible undesired
implications of existing legal distinctions. The common distinctions
might turn the legitimacy of much non-targeted police practice into
luck-based: if police’s suggestions or offers happen to fall on the ear
of a professional criminal who encounters many opportunities to
commit crime, they are legitimate; if they happen to fall on the ear of
a law-abiding citizen who normally keeps away from the world of
crime, they are illegitimate. But if luck determines the legitimacy of
police action, this action is objectionable a-priori. And so, existing
distinctions might actually provide grounds for swiping objection to
police entrapment, or at least to entrapment which is not accurately
targeted.71 Burden reallocation takes luck out of the picture by (a)
assuming that there was some risk – even if minimal - that any en-
trapped defendant might commit crime, and hence any entrapped
defendant created certain social burdens; (b) examining the weight of
these burdens to see whether proactive policing merely pushed them
back to D, or rather involved placing on D burdens which were
heavier than the ones she had originally created.
3.5 Objections to the Proposed Analysis of Entrapment
One possible objection goes to the distinction between victimless
offences and offences directed against victims, suggesting that it is
actually justified to increase D’s punishment expectancy in the con-
69 Fisher, ibid., at 819.
70 Fisher, no. 69 above, at 839.
71 This might be the rationale for Dworkin’s proposal to prohibit untargeted
entrapment. Dworking, no. 1 above.
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text of the first. It is often argued that in the context of victimless
offences, D’s punishment expectancy is lower than it should be, since
such offences are hard to detect and investigate. Entrapment thus
merely increases the punishment expectancy to equate it with that of
defendants committing more easily detectable offences. In Andrew
Ashworth’s words: There are certain types of offences which are not
usually reported by victims … In order to detect those who commit
offences of these kinds, the police may decide to operate proactively,
by setting some kind of trap’.72 From the point of view of burden
reallocation, the argument is that Ds who might commit victimless
offences unjustifiably carry a lower burden than Ds who might
commit offences against victims.
This argument gives rise to several difficulties. First, it does not
take into account the fact that D1 who commits a victimless offence
creates lesser burdens than D2 who commits an offence directed
against victims. The lower risk of exposure of D1 merely reflects this
fact, and accordingly it is not unfair or objectionable. The correlation
between the created burdens and the reallocated burdens finds
expression in the lesser exposure of D1 to defensive force, as we saw;
and it also finds expression in his lower punishment expectancy.
There are no burdened victims who would use radical self-defensive
force or would testify as a way of reallocating the burden.
Alternatively, to accept the argument regarding enforcement dif-
ficulties, one must assume that enforcement difficulties are part of the
burdens D creates and can therefore be legitimately pushed back to
D. Yet while some enforcement difficulties are indeed attributable to
defendants, others are not. When enforcement is risky, e.g. because D
is armed, the risk is attributable to D. In such a case, the risk is not
only for law enforcement agents, but also to potential victims (even if
D only intends to drug deal). This risk will be legitimately reallocated
and placed on D through enforcement techniques that increase the
immediate risk to D (officers will use arms) or D’s punishment ex-
pectancy (entrapment). But assume, for example, an unarmed drug
dealer D1 whose friends reported him to the police and another
unarmed drug dealer D2 whose friends kept quiet and hence
enforcement has become more difficult. It would be plainly unjusti-
fied to punish D2 more than the D1; and it would be similarly
unjustified to use enforcement techniques that increase the punish-
72 Ashworth, no. 7 above, 293–294. See also Dworkin, The Serpent Beguiled Me
and I Did Eat’, no. 1 above, 18; J. D. Heydon, The Problem of Entrapment’,
Cambridge Law Journal 32 (1973) p. 268, 269–270.
THE LAW OF POLICE ENTRAPMENT 69
ment expectancy for D2.73 To generalize, when defendants make
enforcement more risky, these risks can legitimately be reallocated
back to them, but this is not usually the case with victimless offences.
Last, it can be noted that there are many categories of offences,
including offences directed against victims, which are difficult to de-
tect and investigate. To take just a couple of examples, in domestic
abuse the victims would usually not complain or cooperate with the
police; and murders may in some cases be hard to investigate since
there too there is no victim to testify. Compared to these, drug dealers
do not really pose such a great challenge for the police, and
accordingly the assumption that they merit different treatment be-
cause of the alleged special difficulty in detecting and investigating
does not seem to rest on sound factual grounds.
A different objection goes to the conceptualization of entrapment
as a mitigating factor. The English mitigation approach has been
heavily criticized.74 The first ground for criticism, suggested by An-
drew Choo, has been that when the House of Lords decided to treat
entrapment as a mitigating factor, it relied mainly on weak grounds
for not acknowledging entrapment as a substantive defence in law75;
it did not provide grounds for acknowledging entrapment as a miti-
gating factor. This, however, does not mean that there are no grounds
for conceptualizing entrapment as a mitigating factor.
Another ground for criticism, suggested by Andrew Ashworth, has
been that entrapment creates an offence that would probably not
have been committed otherwise;’76 that the right of the defendant to a
73 Similarly, assume that on a given year the police have a lower budget than
usual, and hence enforcement difficulties are increased. If we accept the premise that
enforcement difficulties are to be placed on the shoulders of defendants, this would
mean that on that year extreme enforcement measures should be permitted (e.g.
surveillance should be more invasive; more force can be used by police officers to
prevent crime, and extreme entrapment techniques should be allowed). We can go
further and ask what a normal budget’ is, and whether we should not place on the
shoulders of defendants the burden of less-than-100 % enforcement. Clearly, full
enforcement is often suboptimal – it is close to optimal only in grave personal
offences like rape and murder, as demonstrated by Becker’s economic analysis (no.
13 above); and we already saw that in such offences the proposed analysis too leads
to the conclusion that entrapment is legitimate.
74 See e.g. Choo, no. 7 above, especially pp. 454–456; Ashworth, no. 7 above.
75 Such as the fact that the actus reus and the mens rea were not negated by the
entrapment, and that solicitation by a private citizen would not lead to a full sub-
stantive defence.
76 Ashworth, no. 7 above, at 315.
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fair trial is therefore at stake, and that where this right is violated,
neither excluding the evidence nor mitigating the sentence is sufficient
or adequate.77 Ashworth does contend, though, that mitigating the
sentence might be appropriate where the police deploy proactive
methods which fall short of entrapment.78
This approach can be reconciled with the proposed approach:
Ashworth acknowledges the probabilistic nature of the question
whether the offence would have been committed absent police
intervention, and he seems to contend that where this probability
reaches a certain low threshold, punishment should be zero (and this
is appropriately achieved through stay of proceedings); where this
probability is higher, punishment should be higher though not as
high as in non-entrapment cases (hence mitigating factor). The pro-
posed analysis develops this reasoning by rethinking its underlying
assumptions. Mainly, it is assumed that the original high probability
of commission cannot in itself justify further increase of that prob-
ability through entrapment. A justification for the further increase
can only be found in extra risks D poses for potential victims where
the offence is directed against such victims–extra risks which are
reallocated back to her through entrapment. It has been suggested
that considering entrapment as a mitigating factor accords with the
probabilistic nature of the matter: it allows evaluating by how much
the police increased the likelihood of commission and correcting
exaggerated increase through mitigation. But it is acknowledged that
sometimes the increase will be so excessive (e.g. from punishment
expectancy of 1 day in prison to that of 5 years), that no punishment
should be imposed – as suggested by Ashworth. Thus, the practical
distance from Ashworth’s proposal is not great.
Furthermore, the proposed analysis suggests that theoretically, the
most appropriate conceptualization of entrapment is as a mitigating
factor. This does not mean that other considerations of a more
practical nature should not be taken into account when designing the
law. Ashworth’s approach seems to take into account the general
reluctance of courts to endow mitigation where appropriate. Given
this reluctance, Ashworth’s stay-of-proceedings approach (with mit-
igation in weak cases) may indeed be preferable.
77 Ashworth, no. 7 above, at 315–316.
78 Ashworth, no. 7 above, at 317. Compare with Brendon Murphy and John
Anderson, After the Serpent Beguiled Me: Entrapment and Sentencing in Australia
and Canada’, Queen’s L.J. 39 (2013–2014) p. 621.
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IV CONCLUSIONS
This article has argued that the existing tests for identifying illegiti-
mate entrapment rest on unsound probabilistic assumptions. It has
been shown that the existing tests wrongly presume that in some
identifiable cases entrapment does not raise the probability of D
committing crime of the same type (and hence entrapment does not
raise D’s punishment expectancy). However, probabilistic analysis
demonstrates that this is not the case. In fact, entrapment raises the
probability of crime commission, and hence also D’s punishment
expectancy, in the vast majority of cases; and the rare cases in which
this probability is not raised are not identifiable by the existing tests.
The article then proposed that increasing the probability of
commission may be justified where the relevant offence is directed
against victims and hence creates special risks in addition to the of-
fence’s harm expectancy; but such an increase in the probability of
commission is hardly ever justified where the relevant offence is vic-
timless and hence creates no risks apart from the offence’s harm
expectancy.
It has been further suggested that the appropriate way to account
for the increase in the probability of crime commission and in D’s
punishment expectancy following entrapment is by considering
entrapment as a mitigating factor: where the increase in the proba-
bility of commission and in D’s punishment expectancy is exagger-
ated or misplaced, this increase can be balanced through mitigation
of sentence.
The proposal was based on the idea of burden reallocation which
presents the negative’ side of distributive justice (as opposed to the
positive’ side of reallocation of resources). It rested on the simple
premise that those who create burdens should be the ones to carry
them. Yet the idea of burden reallocation calls for further investi-
gation and development. For example, the circumstances in which
creators of burdens should carry all and only the burdens they have
created should be further explored.79 I shall leave the development of
this idea for future work.
79 Tadros, no. 49 above.
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